Th e present paper focuses on the role of domestic resource mobilization for fi nancing poverty reduction strategies. Policy makers should be aware of important macroeconomic trade-off s associated with MDG strategies fi nanced from tax increases or domestic borrowing. Th e trade-off s are largely intertemporal: can poor and middle-income countries absorb the initial fi nancing costs in order to achieve expected gains in productivity and human development over time? Th is calls for a dynamic economy-wide framework to identify the importance of such trade-off s. Th e paper presents such a framework and illustrates its usefulness in applications for Costa Rica and Ecuador. JEL Classifi cation: C68; I3; F35; O11
1
Leaders from all countries have agreed to pursue the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reach them by 2015 so as to secure a world with less poverty, hunger and disease, better-educated children, greater survival prospects for infants and mothers, and a healthier environment. With less than ten years to the time horizon, the challenges ahead are still staggeringly vast, though there are some signs of progress. In most developing countries, providing every child with primary school education appears to be within our grasp. In the developing world as a whole, income poverty has been on the decline and there have been important gains in assisted child delivery and coverage of vaccination programmes which have contributed to declining child and maternal mortality.
2 Progress has been uneven, however. Most of the gains in declining income poverty in the developing world have been concentrated in much of Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa tends to lag far behind for most of the MDG indicators. Child mortality has been on the decline in all parts of the world, but again with the least relative progress in Africa. Disparities in progress are also vast within countries and many of the poorest tend to be left behind, particularly in rural areas.
Th e MDG agenda refl ects an awareness of such disparities and the challenges ahead, predominantly in the poorest countries. In this context, many donor countries have made explicit commitments to "scale up" aid over the medium term to meet the development goals. Several countries have pledged to reach the United Nations (UN) target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI), and other donors have also made commitments to increase aid which are not linked to the UN target. Offi cial development assistance (ODA) increased substantially in the fi rst half of this decade, although the additional resources appear to be much more modest after excluding the special debt-relief assistance provided to Iraq and Nigeria. Th e modest increase in aid has come with a more signifi cant shift in the allocation of funds towards sub-Saharan Africa, a region which now receives about 40 per cent of total development assistance, up from 25 per cent in 1999. In addition, about 40 of the poorest countries have benefi ted from relief on bilateral external debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Further debt relief from multilateral creditors for the poorest countries was committed at the G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. Th ese commitments refl ect the spirit of the Monterrey Consensus-reached at the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico-to provide more and better aid to developing countries.
Th is focus on aid and the poorest countries is logical as the challenges in reaching the MDGs are greatest in Africa and other least developed countries, many of which lack the necessary resource base for fi nancing the additional action required to meet the goals. According to estimates of the UN Millennium Project, in order to achieve the MDGs, the required additional public expenditures for a typical low-income country with an average per capita income of $300 could amount to 10-20 per cent of its gross national product (GNP). In the central African region, estimates suggest most countries would require more than 20 per cent of GNP (UN Millennium Project, 2005) . If these fi gures are accurate, it would be diffi cult for those countries to fi nance the required additional spending through increased taxation or domestic borrowing. Th erefore, much of the fi nancing would be expected to come from increased aid fl ows. Th is situation has spurred a new debate regarding the trade-off s that could be associated with a "scaling-up" of aid by such magnitudes. Th e eff ectiveness of such a fi nancing strategy has been questioned on several grounds (see, e.g., Heller, 2005; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006) , such as a lack of good governance and of suffi cient absorptive and managerial capacity to effi ciently absorb substantial aid fl ows for investment in MDG-related actions; the potential cost of an appreciating real exchange rate (RER) and the consequent undermining of export competitiveness (often labelled as "Dutch disease"); and constraints on managing macroeconomic policy, both fi scal and monetary, due to the increased reliance on multiple and volatile external sources of fi nancing, as aid fl ows are typically provided by many donors subject to annual allocation processes.
Such issues are highly relevant for the poorest countries and require careful examination before embarking on strategies of massive foreign assistance. Th is, however, should not divert attention from what could be done in terms of domestic resource mobilization, which is another pillar of the Monterrey Consensus, but one that has been less at the forefront of the current debate on fi nancing strategies to achieve the MDGs. Domestic resource mobilization will be central to most middle-income developing countries not eligible for increased aid fl ows and enhanced debt relief. While these countries tend to show indicators which set them closer to achieving the MDG targets, it is nonetheless true that about 40 per cent of the world's poor 3 live in middle-income countries. In addition, because of the inequalities in human development within these countries, as pointed out earlier, there remain tremendous challenges in this part of the developing world as well. While the less poor countries may have greater access to (private) foreign borrowing, it is not entirely obvious that governments would wish to use much of these sources for public investments in social sectors and poverty reduction programmes. Greater reliance on domestic resources may imply stronger redistributive eff ects within the economy which could pose political constraints to this kind of a fi nancing strategy. However, more broadly, the issues faced by aid-recipient countries when shifting budgets to MDGrelated programmes and the related relative price and resource shifts may equally apply to countries relying on domestic fi nancing strategies.
In this paper, we will focus on a number of such trade-off s and (domestic) fi nancing constraints. In the following section, we will review the main issues at stake and the policy options to address related challenges. In a next section, we present the contours of a general equilibrium framework to analyse the trade-off s empirically and which, subsequently, is applied to Costa Rica and Ecuador, two middle-income countries. Conclusions follow in the fi nal section.
Constraints to domestic resource mobilization in developing countries
Th e Monterrey Consensus emphasizes that ensuring conditions to enable the mobilization of domestic resources is essential for development. Th is would entail good governance that is responsive to the people's needs; an appropriate policy and regulatory framework; the fi ghting of corruption at all levels; sound macroeconomic policies aimed at sustaining high growth rates, full employment, stability and poverty eradication; fi scal sustainability; investment in basic economic and social infrastructure; improvement in working conditions; strengthening and development of the domestic fi nancial sector, enhanced by microfi nance and credit for micro-and small and medium-sized enterprises, and the establishment of development banks to further facilitate access to credit.
As is the case with aid fi nancing, domestic resource mobilization for achieving the MDGs may face several constraints, particularly in the short run. Without attempting to be comprehensive, we discuss below some key macroeconomic policy areas and related trade-off s associated with diff erent fi nancing strategies for the achievement of the MDGs: limited policy space for prudent and countercyclical macroeconomic management for growth and employment generation; competitiveness and RER constraints; creating fi scal space and maintaining fi scal sustainability; and labour market constraints.
Countercyclical macroeconomic policies
Economic growth is an essential ingredient for generating domestic resources to attend development needs, including human development. But volatile economic growth can hinder a government's ability to mobilize resources for diff erent purposes. For instance, extended periods of booms and busts did not allow Latin American countries enough time to recover, while domestic savings rates remained practically stagnant during the nineties making multi-year planning impossible (ECLAC, 2001) . Financial crises have also been the single most important cause of increases in urban poverty, particularly in East Asia after the crisis of 1997 (United Nations, 2003) .
More generally, macroeconomic stability strongly infl uences the long-term growth performance of the economy. Macroeconomic stability should be understood in broader terms as entailing more than just preserving price stability and sustainable fi scal balances. It also entails avoiding large swings in economic activity and employment levels and, further, maintaining sustainable external accounts and avoiding exchangerate overvaluation. Th e frequency of fi nancial crises in developing countries indicates that macroeconomic stability involves, in addition, maintaining well-regulated domestic fi nancial sectors, sound balance sheets within the banking system and sound external debt structures.
Th e boom-bust cycles in Latin America during the nineties have closely followed the trend of capital fl ows exacerbated in turn by cyclical macroeconomic policy responses (Ocampo, 2002; . Th us the capacity to conduct countercyclical policies is a necessary condition to reduce volatility and to increase a government's degree of freedom in times of possible crisis and enable it to have enough resources to protect the socially vulnerable and prevent further regress in poverty reduction.
Fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical in many parts of the developing world. Th is is particularly true for Latin America where governments had excessive expenditures during periods of increased credit, such as in the seventies, resulting in unsustainable fi scal defi cits and, consequently, the debt crisis of the eighties. Th is period was then characterized by both fi scal austerity and stagnation when the provision of public and social services was most needed. Th e United Nations World Economic and Social Survey 2006 (United Nations, 2006b) shows that the fi scal policy stance in African and Latin American countries has been highly pro-cyclical on average since the 1960s, whereas in East Asia it has been either neutral or countercyclical. It further shows that the pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy stance has been generally detrimental to long-term growth by exacerbating the short-run volatility in the economy and increasing perceived investment risks and uncertainty.
Social expenditures also have been found to be pro-cyclical in many developing countries, sometimes even more so than total expenditures, especially in Latin America (see, e.g., Martner and Aldunate, 2006) . During downturns particularly, public investments in social and other infrastructure tend to be cut the most. In Africa and Latin America in particular, this has led to important shortfalls in the quality and availability of infrastructure. By some estimates, lagging infrastructural development could account for as much as one third of the diff erence in economic growth performance between East Asian and Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s (see Rodriguez, 2006; United Nations, 2006b ). Improvements in human development and infrastructural quality require adequate and sustained levels of public spending. Infrastructure development requires large-scale investments, which take time to mature. Improvements in education and health also entail longer-term eff orts and require the sustained development and fi nancing of social services. Good infrastructure, education and health can provide important social gains and this justifi es the government's central role in ensuring that society invests in them suffi ciently.
Countercyclical fi scal policies can help smooth the way towards maintaining adequate levels of current government spending and public investment and help ensure that spending on education, health and infrastructure is not unduly curtailed during economic downswings. For many developing country governments, the space for conducting countercyclical macroeconomic policies is limited as the available fi scal and foreign-exchange resources tend to be small relative to the size of the external shocks they face.
Uncertainty regarding the timing and levels of aid disbursements hamper budget planning and the scope for countercyclical policies in low-income countries which rely heavily on aid infl ows. In addition, these countries often also face signifi cant costs to aid effi ciency arising from multiple donor programmes. Th e Paris Declaration on Aid Eff ectiveness of 2005 calls on all donor countries to align their aid programmes for recipient countries and provide more predictable multi-year aid commitments. Along these lines, aid could both enhance the space for conducting countercyclical fi scal policies and more eff ectively serve the resource mobilization for the achievement of the MDGs. As yet, this remains a major challenge and only limited progress has been made to date in achieving such harmonization among aid donors.
Moreover, if international measures, such as better-harmonized aid, actions to mitigate the impact of private capital fl ow volatility or debt relief are insuffi ciently pushed forward, there remains some scope for developing country governments to enhance the space for countercyclical policies by improving the institutional framework for macroeconomic policy-making. First, the more appropriate institutional setting for fi scal policy should strike a balance between fi scal prudence and fi scal fl exibility in a way that ensures both policy credibility and fi scal sustainability. Setting fi scal targets that are independent of the short-term fl uctuations in economic growth (so-called structural budget rules) can be eff ective in forcing a countercyclical policy stance. Some developing countries, such as Chile, have been able to manage such fi scal rules successfully. Furthermore, fi scal stabilization funds could help smooth the revenues from unstable tax sources, such as those based on primary export production, over time. Th e experience with the application of such funds in various parts of the world has varied. Th ey are by no means a panacea, and careful management of such funds is required. Nonetheless, fi scal stabilization funds can constitute an eff ective instrument for resolving issues of intertemporal trade-off s in fi scal spending by protecting growth-enhancing, long-term public investment in infrastructure and human development even during periods of lower tax revenue ushered in by external shocks and economic downturns.
Second, a certain degree of discretionary power should be retained. Since the 1980s, governments of many developing countries have moved from discretionary macroeconomic policy arrangements to rule-based ones. Th is shift was founded on the belief that the latter would avoid policy-generated macroeconomic instability. About 20 economies, for instance, adopted infl ation-targeting as the framework for monetary policy. Under this monetary regime, an independent central bank commits itself to price stability by publicly announcing the level of infl ation it will permit. Th ere are a number of advantages to this kind of policy arrangement, including its potential to enhance central bank policy transparency and credibility. At the same time, however, the narrow focus of monetary policy on a strict infl ation target may be detrimental to the simultaneous achievement of employment and growth objectives. Rule-based policies may function well for some time and when the economy is not suff ering from major shocks. However, as the structure of the economy changes over time, so will vulnerability to external shocks. For instance, fi nancial shocks may become more important than terms-of-trade shocks. In such a changing context, predetermined policy rules are likely to become less relevant or turn out to be too rigid. Moreover, as the risks and uncertainties facing an economy never present themselves in exactly the same way or with the same degree of intensity, a certain amount of space for discretionary policies is always needed in order for adjustments to be made that will minimize macroeconomic losses.
Th ird, macroeconomic policies should be well integrated with other areas of economic policy-making. A competitive RER seems to be critical in this regard. In the fast-growing East Asian economies, for example, macroeconomic policies were part of a broader development strategy, contributing directly to longrun growth. Fiscal policies in these economies have given priority to development spending, including investment in education, health and infrastructure, as well as subsidies and credit guarantees for export industries. Monetary policy was coordinated with fi nancial sector and industrial policies, including directed and subsidized credit schemes and managed interest rates, to directly infl uence investment and saving, whereas competitive exchange rates were considered essential for encouraging exports and export diversifi cation. In contrast, macroeconomic policies in many Latin American and African countries since the 1980s have been focused on much more narrowly defi ned short-term stabilization objectives, often resulting in exchange-rate overvaluation (see United Nations, 2006b; Ocampo and Vos, 2006) .
Competitiveness and real exchange rate constraints
While growth is important to ease the path towards MDG achievement, in most countries much greater priority will need to be given to public spending to meet infrastructure needs and improve the quality and coverage of basic social services. When fi nanced through aid fl ows (or foreign borrowing for that matter), upward pressure will most certainly be put on the RER, resulting in a loss of competitiveness of exports and import-competing fi rms. Th is may have important implications for long-term growth, as the export sector in many developing countries is an important contributor to aggregate growth and has potential dynamic spillover eff ects into the economy at large. Th e RER appreciation is often labelled as the Dutch disease eff ect, but this relative price shift can only be called a "disease" if it leads to a resource allocation away from export industries resulting in an undesirable structural change away from dynamic production activities.
One way to defi ne the RER is to see it as the relative price of "tradables" to "non-tradables". Government services, including education and health, and infrastructure are typically seen as "non-tradable commodities" and a lot of MDG-related expenditures are therefore considered non-tradables. Consequently, a large shift in domestic spending for MDG-related goods and services will push up demand for non-tradables. Th e price and cost of MDG-related services is likely to increase as a consequence since the government will try to hire, more teachers and medical personnel, among others, and may have to increase their wages if such workers are in short supply. 4 Rising costs of non-tradable services will shift relative prices against tradables, thus inducing an RER appreciation as defi ned above no matter how the increased spending is fi nanced. Hence, RER constraints may also emerge with domestic resource mobilization for the MDGs.
Th e actual impact on the exchange rate and competitiveness will depend, however, on many factors. One factor relates to the impact on import demand. In the case of aid or foreign borrowing, the larger the share of foreign resources that is absorbed domestically and the lower the import demand elasticity, the greater the real appreciation eff ect. Th e impact on import demand will depend on the import intensity of MDG-related expenditures, as well as on the multiplier eff ect of MDG expenditures on aggregate demand and the import propensity of aggregate demand in general. Th e import intensity also matters in the case of domestic resource mobilization. Assuming, as already mentioned, that MDG expenditures tend to have low import intensity and that most of the eff ects of such expenditures on overall economic growth and productivity occurs with a time lag, then the pressure for the exchange rate to appreciate in the short run may be great, no matter the source of fi nancing. Second, the short-run pressure on domestic prices will further depend on the existing production capacity and will be less if there is scope for extending the coverage of services without much additional investment. Th ird, MDG services like education and health may be heavily subsidized and off ered with more or less fi xed prices. Furthermore, under such conditions relative prices may still move against tradables, if taxation or domestic government borrowing crowds out private demand for tradables and lowers the price of such commodities. Fourth, the impact will depend on the exchange-rate regime and access to foreign borrowing. If the domestic resource mobilization for MDG achievement leads to a relative price shift against tradables, this could induce a growing trade defi cit. If this can be covered by foreign borrowing or investment, then the tendency towards an RER appreciation will be strengthened. If there is insuffi cient access to foreign savings, the nominal exchange rate would need to devalue, thus counteracting the initial relative price shift. For countries with fi xed exchange-rate regimes or dollarized economies and with limited access to foreign fi nancing, something else will need to give. Most likely, private domestic spending would need to contract to compress import demand and thereby contain the ensuing increase of the trade defi cit. Finally, the impact on competitiveness of upward pressure on the RER will also depend on how greater achievement of the MDGs will aff ect the economy over time. Better infrastructure and a better-educated and healthier labour force may have important externalities in the form of productivity growth, attract foreign investors and thereby have a dynamic impact on economic growth. Th is presents an intertemporal trade-off , because the RER appreciation would erode export competitiveness in the short run, while productivity gains and faster economic growth from increased MDG achievement would pay off in the long run. Th e question then is whether the negative short-run eff ects can be contained so as not to limit the resources available for long-term investments in human capital.
Th e empirical literature on Dutch disease shows a wide range of RER adjustments in response to strong increases in aid fl ows, and the size of the eff ects largely depend on the relative demand and supply eff ects across sectors, and thus on country-specifi c circumstances (Bevan, 2005; Heller, 2005; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006; and Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006) . Similarly, the degree to which increased taxation or domestic government borrowing will change the composition of domestic demand will depend on how private investors respond to higher public indebtedness and possible higher domestic interest rates, and which parts of the population have to carry the extra tax burden, and so on.
In summary, the risk of a loss of export competitiveness due to larger MDG expenditures is clear and present also in the case of domestic fi nancing, but one cannot say a priori that a poverty reduction strategy aiming at increased public expenditures for the MDGs would be harmful for growth or exports. Th e long-term economic gains from improved MDG achievement are diffi cult to predict, however, and the interactions with changes in the economic structure of the economy are highly complex and depend on the institutional features of the economy.
Creating fi scal space for MDG investment

Tax reform
Taxation should be central to any strategy for domestic resource mobilization aimed at enhancing public expenditures for social development. Many developing countries would seem to have signifi cant scope for increasing the tax eff ort. In Latin America, for instance, average tax revenues amounted to only 17 per cent of GDP in 2004, less than half of the average for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Only Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had tax revenues above 25 per cent of GDP (Martner and Aldunate, 2006) . Total government revenues, which include gains from export commodities of public enterprises, capital revenues and social security contributions, are less than 25 per cent of GDP on average. Indirect taxation in Latin America accounts for the bulk of the revenues, with direct taxes bringing in only about one fi fth of the revenues. Among the revenues from indirect taxation, the value-added tax (VAT) is the most important instrument in Latin America, especially now that most countries rely much less on import duties and other trade taxes as a result of trade liberalization. Th e smaller economies, such as those in Central America and the Caribbean, for example, have been highly dependent on trade taxes, but these revenues have been on the decline since the nineties (Escaith and Inoue, 2001) . Although the VAT rate varies greatly by country in Latin America and is diff erentiated in some countries according to the type of product, the average rate is around 15 per cent, which is 5 points lower than the OECD average. Since raising the VAT rate can be politically diffi cult, VAT reforms should fi rst concentrate on reducing evasion and increasing collection effi ciency.
In most Latin American countries there is much scope for increasing fi scal space through direct taxation of personal and corporate incomes, although high evasion rates signal political constraints here also. Moreover, in recent years, income tax reforms in Latin America have focused in general on decreasing the high-end marginal tax rates by about 3 percentage points on average while increasing the lower-end marginal rates by more than two percentage points and reducing the number of taxable income brackets, making direct taxation more regressive (Martner and Aldunate, 2006) .
Increased taxation may aff ect domestic demand as consumers will have less disposable income and investors may foresee lower net profi ts. Moreover, reduced disposable income and profi ts are likely to constrain private savings for investment fi nancing. Th e domestic demand eff ect will also depend on who is to carry the additional tax burden. If indirect taxes have a greater eff ect on low-income households, reforms pushing for increases in VAT and other indirect taxes could then off set some of the welfare gains the poor would have received from enhanced MDG expenditures. In addition, if increased tax eff orts are more distribution neutral, they could aff ect the poor through lower economic growth in the short run as private domestic demand would fall. Increased public expenditures would compensate for this, but the long-run growth eff ects would depend on the effi ciency of these expenditures.
Effi cient budget allocations
A great deal of focus has been given to the additional spending requirements in recent discussions about the costing of the MDGs. However, one should not lose sight of the ample scope in many countries for more eff ective budget allocations in favour of poverty reduction and other MDG-related programmes. Th ese will likely be contentious political issues as well, since they will touch upon a broader social priority setting. In many developing countries, much of the budgeting process tends to involve debate around marginal increases from the previous year's budget evolving around pressures from various interest groups. Much of this process also tends to have, at best, a very loose relationship with needs assessments and costing exercises of actual development programmes. Th is has become clear once more in the context of many of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) prepared in the context of the debt relief off ered as part of the HIPC Initiative. Links between proposed actions in the PRSPs and budget requirements and priorities have typically remained rather vague and poorly specifi ed. Support to countries in the context of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) developed by the World Bank intends to strengthen these links, but the implementation of the framework has not proven to be easy as some studies show (see, e.g., ODI, 2003; Vos and Cabezas, 2006; Vos, Cabezas and Komives, 2006) . Much of the implied diffi culties are of course political, but a well-defi ned MTEF could in principle help to overcome such hurdles by making the priority setting more explicit and by tying the budget allocations to actions and expected outcomes and, hence, making the budgeting process more transparent and enhancing accountability.
When trying to gain fi scal space for MDG-related spending, there are at least three levels at which one could seek greater eff ectiveness in government spending. First, resetting priorities across budget items could create more space for MDG-related spending. Th is could entail readjustments across government sectors or ministries (e.g., from defence spending to education and health), or across subsectors within ministries or programmes (e.g., from higher education to primary and secondary education).
Second, there may be scope for improving the effi ciency in the delivery of services. Th e quality and effi ciency with which public services are provided will diff er from country to country and ineffi ciencies can emerge for a variety of reasons. In some cases there may be blatant ineffi ciencies, however, such as absenteeism among teaching and medical personnel, which, if dealt with, could entail important fi scal savings. For instance, primary school teacher absence rates have been found to be as high as 27 per cent in Uganda, 25 per cent in India, 19 per cent in Indonesia, and 14 per cent in Ecuador (see Rogers and others, 2004) . In the case of Ecuador, for instance, it has been estimated that reducing primary school teacher absenteeism by half could "save" about 2 per cent of the overall budget for the education sector. In the health care sector, a shortage of medical personnel may not be the only, or even the main, problem for improving coverage of health services. For instance, doctors and nurses tend to be mostly present in the main urban centres, leaving the rest of the country uncovered (see, e.g., Vos and others, 2004; World Bank, 2004) . Problems such as these and many others suggest that with a more effi cient delivery of services the same amount of resources could yield much higher outcomes in education and health.
Th ird, even without such ineffi ciencies in delivery systems, MDG-related spending could be made more cost-eff ective by ensuring that within programmes and subsectors resources are prioritized towards those "inputs" and activities which produce the larger outcome per dollar spent. For instance, a cost-eff ectiveness analysis of the actions needed to meet the target of universal primary education in Ecuador suggested that with a more effi cient allocation of resources it would be possible to achieve the education MDG at an annual extra cost of 0.2 per cent of GDP; it could even be at zero extra cost if the rather generous existing pupil-teacher ratio in primary education was allowed to increase from 23 to 25 (Vos and Ponce 2004) . Specifi cally, a more cost-eff ective allocation of resources would entail focusing incremental budget resources on hiring better-trained teachers, expanding a conditional cash transfer programme to stimulate school attendance by the poor and improving the availability of rural schooling infrastructure. More generally, comparisons of such cost-eff ectiveness analyses for education and health in diff erent country contexts suggest that the bottlenecks in achieving MDG targets tend to be country-specifi c depending on existing delivery systems and socio-economic conditions, and hence are diffi cult to generalize. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that more cost-eff ective budget allocations could yield important fi scal savings when compared to needs assessments based on existing allocation patterns.
In order to measure the quality and effi ciency of social programmes, some countries have already adopted public investment registries and evaluation systems. In theory, these would accord policy makers a tool to identify the most effi cient or cost-eff ective programmes and allocate resources accordingly. However, in practice, these systems may encounter opposition from stakeholders and may lack suffi cient political support to achieve the objective of more effi cient redistribution of resources (ECLAC, 2002; Vos and Ponce, 2004; Martner and Aldunate, 2006) .
Domestic borrowing and fi scal sustainability
In the short run, revenues and expenditures determine an important part of the domestic resources available for social development. However, in the medium and long run, what happens "below the line" of fi scal accounts (i.e., the fi nancing of defi cits) will determine the sustainability of fi scal resources.
In the case of heavily indebted poor countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA) monitor their debt situation and needs. More recently, a Debt Sustainability Framework was established to detect the debt-related vulnerabilities of the HIPCs and prevent unsustainable debt build-ups. Despite progress in the overall debt situation, it has been found that only a small percentage of the HIPC programmes have specifi cally considered the costs for achieving the MDGs (United Nations, 2006c). Even in those countries where costing has been done, the resulting resources made available from debt relief are not enough to achieve the MDGs by 2015 (United Nations, 2006d). In addition, scaled-up aid with external debt relief does not preclude increasing public indebtedness as some recent evidence shows (e.g., Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006) . Th is may particularly be the case if monetary authorities are concerned with the liquidity impact of increases in aid-induced spending and try to sterilize through the sale of government securities or central bank sterilization loans. Th is may reduce the potential infl ationary impact of aid-fi nanced public spending, but at the same time it will raise domestic debt accumulation, which may increase domestic interest rates and crowd out domestic credit supplies to private investors. With poorly developed domestic fi nancial sectors and shallow capital and securities markets, this may further induce strong interest rate volatility with additional negative repercussions for investment demand, as occurred, for instance, in Uganda (Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006) . Such issues may be even more relevant in the case of middle-income countries. Th ese are typically not eligible for external debt relief, except perhaps in times of crisis, and must rely more on market-based instruments. Most developing countries have local currency bond markets to varying degrees of depth, liquidity and type of instrument. However, many tend to have rather poorly developed markets for longterm government and corporate bonds denominated in local currency. Th e lack of a domestic bond market makes it more diffi cult to fi nance long-term public infrastructure investments and major private modernization projects (see United Nations, 2006b). It also forces fi rms to use short-term debt to fi nance long-term investment, thereby accumulating maturity mismatches in their balance sheets, or to borrow abroad, leading to currency mismatches. Th e mix of such maturity and currency mismatches enhances the fragility of the fi nancial system during periods of exchange-rate depreciation and rising interest rates. Th e insuffi cient development of the domestic bond market and the associated risk of fi nancial fragility reduce in turn the policy space for monetary intervention when dealing with external shocks. A poorly developed bond market in conjunction with a relatively low level of fi nancial savings in the economy may imply further that gov-ernment demand for domestic fi nancing of its defi cits may have rather strong upward eff ects on domestic interest rates. Under such circumstances, heavy reliance on domestic borrowing to fi nance the MDG strategy could lead to a quickly rising domestic debt-service burden. Rising interest rates will also increase the cost of borrowing for private investors and hence domestically fi nanced MDG investments could crowd out private investments and lower economic growth.
Th e importance of the development of domestic bond markets was also made evident by the Asian crisis and led to a stronger focus of fi nancial policies on this issue. As a result, domestic bond markets have grown rapidly since the late 1990s, not only in Asia, Latin America and the emerging market economies in Europe, but -to a lesser extent -also in Africa (see Ocampo and Griffi th-Jones, 2006; United Nations, 2006b; Ocampo and Vos, 2006) . Where such markets have been made to function, governments will have greater scope for domestic resource mobilization for the MDGs through the bond market along with a lower risk of crowding out private investment. Th e risks associated with rapid domestic government indebtedness may still exist and intertemporal trade-off s need to be assessed with caution, that is to say, governments will have to assess their debt sustainability. Th is will depend mainly on the extent to which the MDG-related investments will translate in a timely manner into economic returns (through productivity increases, crowding-in of private investments) to the extent that economic growth and sustained low interest rates will ensure a fi scally sustainable fi nancing strategy.
Labour market constraints
For low-income countries, large-scale investments for the achievement of the MDGs could meet severe skilled labour constraints in the short-to-medium run. Public expenditures centred on meeting the MDGs in the form of expanding basic social services in health and education will put high pressure on a pool of teachers, doctors and other trained workers that is likely to be limited. Constraints on skilled labour could then lead to upward pressure on the skill premium for such workers which in turn would increase the overall labour costs for the public sector and the cost for achieving the MDGs. Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) suggests that for reasons such as these a sequenced approach to expanding MDG-related social services may be needed in order to avoid disruptive pressures on labour costs owing to skill bottlenecks. Investing in specialized education and training for teachers and medical personnel should then precede or move in parallel with the expansion of the services themselves.
In middle-income countries, such constraints may also exist but are likely to be less severe as these countries tend to have higher initial average educational levels. 5 Trying to achieve the MDGs may induce other labour-market constraints over time, however. As the MDG target (and beyond) for education is achieved, the supply of skilled workers in the labour market will increase. If the economy's structure does not adjust commensurately to absorb the increased supply of better-educated workers, the skill premium will likely fall. While this, in turn, may lower the cost of achieving the MDGs, it will also likely provide a disincentive to invest in education. Most empirical studies of the determinants of access to education indicate that expected private returns to education are by far not the sole factor, but an important one nonetheless (Glewwe, 2002) . Hence, insuffi cient creation of skilled jobs in the economy could jeopardize the achievement of the education MDG. Th is could induce additional eff orts by the government to stimulate school attendance, but in such a case, the real problem would be how to improve the environment for stimulating a structural change in the economy towards technologies and activities that can absorb larger amounts of skilled labour.
Th e way the indicated trade-off s present themselves will depend further on the functioning of the labour market, that is to say, the degree of labour-market segmentation and fl exibility in real wage adjustment. Labour markets in developing countries are typically segmented owing to many factors that would not allow some workers to fi nd a job in some sectors. High barriers to entry into MDG-related sectors may prevent the real wage from adjusting fl exibly. For example, skill requirements may be very high in some MDG-related sectors, particularly in activities that should be relatively advanced from a technological point of view, for example, hospital attention. Th is may prevent certain types of workers with a higher education but who do not possess the required skills from having full access to jobs in MDG-related sectors. If skilled, but not highlyskilled, workers end up seeking employment in non-MDG-related sectors, the real wage in these sectors will likely fall. Should the real wage adjustment be insuffi cient to clear the labour market, unemployment and, most likely, underemployment will emerge, resulting in negative repercussions in terms of rising income inequality and poverty.
In conclusion, reducing the aforementioned constraints -that is to say, by creating policy space in order to be able to execute countercyclical policies; shifting the objective of macroeconomic policies to a broader defi nition of stability and making full employment the primary objective; creating fi scal space through increased taxation; achieving greater effi ciency in social expenditures; and reaching debt sustainability with competitive exchange rates -should in theory help mobilize domestic resources and enable countries to close in on the MDGs. As these factors tend to present themselves diff erently across countries, we need empirical tools to help us gauge the economy-wide implications of each of these trade-off s and the achievement of the MDGs in any given context.
An economy-wide framework to analyze feasible fi nancing strategies for achieving the MDGs
Many of the issues discussed in the previous section require an economy-wide framework to examine the capacity and fi nancing constraints to achieving the MDGs and the trade-off s with other economic policy goals. Th e existence of such interaction eff ects is the rationale for the use of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Th e pursuit of a strategy towards the achievement of the MDGs will likely have strong eff ects throughout the economy. It will surely aff ect the demand and supply for diff erent types of goods and services, for labour and capital, and for foreign exchange, and the related adjustments may imply both trade-off s and synergies throughout the achievement of the MDGs. Th ese feedback eff ects may substantially alter the outcomes of studies that focus on sector analysis, such as the needs for and cost implications of separately pursuing the goals for education, health and so on. In addition, the general equilibrium framework, as depicted, also takes into consideration the possible synergies between the diff erent MDGs. Such synergies may infl uence the required expansion of services (e.g., greater coverage of drinking water supply may reduce the need for health-service expansion) or the speed at which the various MDGs can be achieved.
Th e outcomes will also depend to an important extent on the way in which the strategy is fi nanced. Foreign fi nancing may induce RER eff ects of the type discussed above, while fi nancing through domestic taxes could reduce private consumption demand, among other things, or domestic borrowing could crowd out credit resources for private investment. Policy makers thus may face important trade-off s. No doubt increased public spending is essential for achieving the MDGs, but adjustments in the RER, real wages and other relative prices may increase the unit costs for achieving the MDGs along with the costs for other sectors, or discourage exports and thereby enhance the need for foreign fi nancing, and so on. Th e productivity gains which improved MDG achievement may generate will likely be attained with a time lag and thus have little impact on growth in the short and medium term. Th erefore, it is critical that the short-run trade-off s do not off set potential economic and social gains.
Dynamic CGE models for the simulation of policies aimed at human development goals have been developed before in studies of the 1970s and 1980s, especially in those providing analytical depth to the so-called basic needs approach to development (see, e.g., Kouwenaar, 1986; Hopkins and van der Hoeven, 1982) . At the time, such exercises were very time consuming and costly because of data limitations and computational requirements. However, the shift away from concerns about employment, income distribution and poverty to macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in mainstream development policies also de-emphasized the need for such modelling eff orts. More recently, work undertaken at the World Bank has revived the approach in the context of the ongoing debate about scaling up resources to achieve the MDGs. Th is framework has been labelled MAMS (Maquette for MDG Simulation) as originally presented in Löfgren (2004) and Bourguignon and others (2004) . Th e framework was originally designed to deal in particular with low-income country contexts and the trade-off s associated with the scaling-up of aid infl ows for MDG-related expenditures. In an ongoing joint project coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN/DESA and the World Bank, this framework has been extended and applied in 19 Latin American countries. See Löfgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006) for a revised version of MAMS incorporating the feedback from this experience.
Th e MAMS framework has been built from a fairly standard CGE framework with dynamic-recursive features but incorporates a special module which specifi es the main determinants of MDG achievement and the direct impact of enhanced public expenditures on MDG-related infrastructure and services. MAMS considers the MDGs for poverty reduction (MDG 1), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), reducing under-fi ve and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) and increasing access to safe water and basic sanitation (MDG 7). In the case of MDG 2, the demand for primary and other levels of schooling is a function of student behaviour (enrolment, repetition, graduation). Student behaviour, in turn, depends on the quality of education (identifi ed by variables such as classroom availability and student-teacher ratios), the income incentives (the expected wage premium from education), the under-fi ve mortality rate (a proxy for the health status of the student population), household consumption per capita (capacity to pay for education and opportunity costs) and the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the eff ective distance to school). Under-fi ve and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) are seen to be determined by the availability of public and private health services, household consumption per capita, the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the eff ective distance to health centres and hospitals), and the coverage of water and sanitation services. Access to water and sanitation (MDG 7) are modelled as a function of household consumption per capita, the provision of such services by public or private providers and the level of public infrastructure. Th e income poverty goal (MDG 1) is seen as the outcome of the overall general equilibrium eff ects from dynamic adjustments in production, employment, wages and other relative prices, as well as changes in the quality of human capital through MDG-related expenditures. 6 Th e model includes a rather detailed specifi cation of social services related to the MDGs, spelling out diff erent levels of education, diff erent health sectors, sectors for drinking water and sanitation and other public infrastructure. In the model specifi cations, these services may be provided publicly or privately. Nonetheless, it is only new government investment and current expenditures that will lead to a policy-driven increase in the supply of MDG-related services and public infrastructure (see fi gure 1). For this to happen, the government is assumed to resort to suffi cient fi nancing for the new investment mobilized either domestically or from abroad. 
MDG achievement and economy-wide effects in MAMS
6 Th e fi nal outcome for income poverty (MDG 1) can be estimated by looking at the outcomes for per capita household income and consumption for diff erent household groups. However, CGE models can typically only specify a limited number of representative households, which results in insuffi cient detail regarding changes in the distribution to be able to make robust statements regarding the poverty outcomes. In consequence, the CGE analysis needs to be supplemented by certain assumptions (such as fi xed within group distributions) or, as has been done for the empirical analysis reported here, by a method of microsimulations, which takes the labour market outcomes (relative remunerations, employment, changes in skill level) from the CGE for diff erent types of workers and applies them to a micro data set (such as a household survey) to obtain the required details about income distribution for the poverty analysis. See Bourguignon and others (2002) and Vos and others (2006) for a discussion and application of such methods in conjunction with CGE model analysis. 
MDG achievement Economy-wide (CGE) effects
Government spending & investment in MDGrelated sectors
Source: Authors' construction based upon the mathematical summary presentation of MAMS in Löfgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006) .
Achievements in education involve the enlargement of school infrastructure and a higher premium wage for better-educated workers. Th e greater the availability of public infrastructure, including that in MDG-related sectors other than education, the larger the capital stock, leaving room for factor productivity growth in the model (see fi gure 1).
7 Th e quality of the stock of labour will improve over time as more bettereducated prospective workers leave the schooling system. Th is will further enhance productivity growth with subsequent wage-and income-distribution eff ects. Growth can be encouraged as a result of the productivity gains; this has the potential to lead to economy-wide eff ects which in turn will aff ect MDG achievement (see fi gure 1). Achievements in drinking water and sanitation supply also help to improve health conditions, and in turn improved health status may impact positively on education outcomes along with other determinants. Per capita household consumption responds positively to the government's increasing the supply of MDG-related services and this may have further favourable implications for MDG achievement. Since this is an economy-wide model, per capita household consumption can also change as a result of relative price changes. All domestic income changes aff ect the economy's capacity to generate savings. Th e macroeconomic viability of fi nancing the new MDG sector investment will depend on the macroeconomic constraints of the country, the initial debt burden, the source of fi nancing, and the productivity of public investments towards the MDGs, among other factors.
Domestic resource mobilization for MDG achievement: country applications
As indicated, the MAMS framework is being applied in 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in an ongoing joint project coordinated by UNDP, UN/DESA and the World Bank. Here, we focus on some of the simulation results of that project that are derived from the applications of Costa Rica and Ecuador. Th ese are two middle-income countries with large diff erences in terms of initial levels of MDG achievement. On the one hand, Costa Rica achieved the MDGs in the areas of access to water and sanitation and extreme poverty before 2000; however, the country experienced a setback in extreme poverty thereafter, but the problem aff ects no more than 2.8 per cent of the population living on less than $1 per day. Th e country is also evolving quite satisfactorily towards the achievement of the other MDGs (Sánchez, 2006) . Costa Rica's indicators for under-fi ve and maternal mortality are already among the lowest in Latin America. Even though Costa Rica is close to achieving the MDGs, to such an extent that the additional resource requirements to reach them are likely to be relatively low, macroeconomic trade-off s will likely need to be considered. On the other hand, in contrast, Ecuador faces bigger challenges in meeting the goals. In fact, under the current growth outlook and with existing policies, this country is off track for reaching all the goals, except for MDGs 4 and 5. Extreme poverty stood at about 15 per cent by 2000, and not even tripling the historical average per capita income growth rate (to 3 per cent per annum) would be suffi cient to achieve MDG 1 by 2015 (León, Rosero and Vos, 2006) . Th e high income inequality in the country severely limits the trickling down of economic growth to the poor. Either much faster growth or a radical income redistribution programme would be needed to achieve that target. Net enrolment and completion rates in primary education reached 90 and 67 per cent, respectively, in 1990. Th ere was little progress during the 1990s, but after the major economic crisis of 1999 several social programmes targeted towards the poor were boosted, including a cash-transfer programme conditioned to school attendance. Th ese eff orts helped to increase net primary enrolment to 95 per cent and the completion rate to 82.7 per cent by 2005. Progress has been more continuous in health, as under-fi ve mortality fell from 43.0 to 20.7 per 1,000 live births in the same period and the scarce available data suggest that maternal mortality fell from 117 to 67 per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2002.
With continued (linear) trends, both health MDGs would be within reach by 2015. Coverage of drinking water supply and sanitation are still far off target, as 21 per cent of the population is without access to drinking water and 50 per cent without access to adequate sewerage systems.
In order to analyse the trade-off s associated with alternative fi nancing strategies to reach the MDGs, we fi rst defi ne a baseline or "business-as-usual" (BAU) scenario. Th e BAU essentially identifi es the economic trajectory from the base year to 2015, assuming that MDG-related government spending continues to grow at past trends and all other policy variables remain unchanged. Th e base-year solution of MAMS is calibrated using data and parameters defi ning the economic structure and key behavioural relationships. Most of the data and parameters are estimated using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). Key elasticities, in particular those that defi ne the behaviour related to the achievement of the MDGs, have been derived from microeconometric analyses specifi c to each country. In the dynamic solution of the model, the size of the population and the composition of the labour force is updated recursively according to given growth rates and the degree of MDG achievement.
Subsequently, we run a number of "MDG scenarios" under alternative fi nancing strategies in order to simulate a situation where all MDGs will be achieved in a timely manner, except that of poverty (MDG 1), which is seen to depend on the economic interaction eff ects taking place over time, as indicated earlier.
For the MDGs in education, health, and water and sanitation, the model calculates the cost of achieving the targets given the existing shortfalls, the cost structure (and endogenous changes in relative prices) of providing MDG-related services, and household demand for these services. Th e cost requirements are estimated according to the fi nancing strategy for which the model is solved. For instance, outcomes for relative prices (including real wages and the RER) may diff er depending on whether the strategy is fi nanced through increased taxes, domestic borrowing or foreign loans; this in turn may imply diff erent impacts on unit costs for providing the MDG services. To determine the main trade-off s in mobilizing resources from diff erent sources to achieve the MDGs, the results of the BAU are compared with those of the MDG scenarios. 8 We will discuss the results for the two country cases separately.
Costa Rica
As the targets for water and sanitation (MDG 7) had already been reached in Costa Rica by 2000, this millennium goal is not considered in the model simulations. BAU appears to be relatively adequate with regard to the goal for increasing the primary school completion rate and reducing under-fi ve mortality. Th e related targets will be close to achievement in 2015 under the BAU scenario (see table 1). Th ere will also be a considerable reduction in maternal mortality. Consequently, the extra costs of the aforementioned three MDG 8 Several other scenarios not discussed here were also generated, including a situation in which each MDG is achieved separately next to that in which MDGs 2, 4, 5 and 7 are all achieved at the same time.
Comparing these situations allows us to study possible synergies and trade-off s between trying to achieve all MDGs simultaneously or in a sequenced manner. Further, assumptions about macroeconomic closure rules are important when analysing CGE simulation results. Th e MAMS specifi cation used for the present analysis allows for unemployment and hence imperfect wage adjustment in the diff erent labour-market segments. Th e real exchange rate adjusts fl exibly to generate just the amount of foreign savings that would clear any emerging imbalance of the current account with the rest of the world, assuming all other components of the capital account of the balance of payments remain fi xed. Adjustment of the government balance depends on which fi nancing strategy is adopted. In the case of tax fi nancing, direct tax rates are increased endogenously so as to mobilize the resources for the additional public expenditures, while with regard to domestic borrowing direct tax rates stay fi xed and the ensuing government defi cit is fi nanced through government-bond emissions. Aggregate investment is assumed to be savings-constrained in the model simulations reported here.
scenarios are not expected to be very large, although the degree of extreme poverty reduction is insuffi cient to meet the target.
In order to achieve MDGs 2, 4 and 5, fi nal government consumption will have to increase by 1 percentage point of GDP per year over and above the level of spending of the BAU scenario. Public investment in education and health services will have to increase by , respectively, 0.3 and 0.8 percentage points of GDP per year compared to the BAU scenario (see table 2). Th ese additional cost estimates are more or less the same under all fi nancing scenarios; they are only slightly lower when the additional government spending is fi nanced through foreign borrowing.
Dutch disease eff ects are visible both in the BAU and in the MDG scenarios. Th e baseline trend is already towards larger spending on non-tradables. Th ere is some erosion of export competitiveness because the tendency towards RER appreciation is not fully corrected by Costa Rica's managed fl oating exchangerate regime. In view of the country's MDG achievements, the degree of RER appreciation is not very strong (about 4 per cent for the whole period). Th e appreciation eff ect is initially stronger when the MDG strategy is fi nanced through external borrowing (see fi gure 2). Source: Sánchez (2006) , based on the MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Poverty results are estimated after running a microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6). b A less ambitious national target for maternal mortality is used as justifi ed in Sánchez (2006) . Th e international MDG target for maternal mortality would be 8.3 deaths per 100,000 live births. Source: Sánchez (2006) , based on the MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Th e additional costs are for the foreign fi nancing scenario and are measured as percentage deviations with respect to the BAU scenario. Th ey only increase marginally when there is mobilization of domestic resources to fi nance the new public investment. Th e alternative forms of resource mobilization have a greater eff ect on private investment. Specifically, the model simulations suggest a strong crowding-out eff ect if the government resorts to bond fi nancing (see fi gure 3). With greater government demand for private savings, less domestic credit becomes available for private investors and investment levels increase at a considerably slower pace under this fi nancing scenario compared to the BAU or the other two MDG scenarios. In the case of tax fi nancing, there is also some crowding-out of private investment, albeit only slight. Both the RER appreciation and the impact on private investment aff ect export supply. Exports represent more than 40 per cent of GDP in Costa Rica and are the engine of growth (see Sánchez and Sauma, 2006) . As shown by Sánchez (2004) , Costa Rican exports are highly sensitive to exchange-rate adjustments as well as to domestic credit supplies and investment in export activities. Consequently, as depicted in fi gure 4, the stronger the crowding-out and the RER appreciation eff ects, the slower the export growth becomes. In the same vein, GDP growth is slightly slower under the domestic fi nancing scenario (see fi gure 5).
BAU
Foreign borrowing Taxes Domestic borrowing Except for the domestic fi nancing scenario, the alternative fi nancing mechanisms generally have a similar impact on employment and wage trends. Over time, improvements in education lead to increased supplies of semi-skilled and skilled workers. Th is is also the case under the BAU scenario. Th e composition of labour demand does not change commensurately; hence, each of the scenarios shows rising real labour incomes for unskilled workers (who start running in short supply) and the wage premium for better-educated workers falls. Both the rise in average real wages and the drop in wage inequality help reduce extreme income poverty, yet not to a suffi cient enough degree as to achieve MDG 1 (see fi gure 6). Th e MDG scenarios, however, do not improve the degree of poverty reduction; this is mainly due to the loss of export growth associated with the RER appreciation, the crowding-out of private investment under the domestic borrowing scenario, and the initial loss of disposable household income due to increased tax rates under the tax-fi nancing scenario. Th e results, while in the case of Costa Rica showing rather small variations among already low extreme poverty rates, could suggest that a mixed fi nancing strategy might be better if only to avoid some of the related trade-off s. Th e tax-fi nancing scenario shows a negative impact on poverty reduction early on in the strategy, while the foreign-fi nancing scenario creates stronger RER appreciation with negative overall employment eff ects originating from the export sector around 2010. A crowding-out of private investment starts to hurt poverty reduction at a later stage.
Fiscal sustainability of the MDG strategy seems best preserved when recurring to tax fi nancing.
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Direct tax income would increase by 1.6 percentage points of GDP relative to the BAU scenario. Th e budget defi cit would not increase, and domestic and external debt-to-GDP ratios would stay at current levels, which are considered sustainable at about 28 and 21 per cent of GDP, respectively. Financing of the MDG strategy through domestic borrowing would lead to rising fi scal defi cits and a sharply rising domestic debt burden to possibly unsustainable levels. Th e domestic debt-to-GDP ratio would nearly double between 2002 and 2015: from 38.2 to 66.9 per cent (see fi gure 7). In recent history, the country's domestic government debt has never risen over 40 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, foreign fi nancing of the MDG strategy would lead to a substantial increase in foreign debt, though likely staying below critical levels, as it would increase to 33 per cent of GDP in 2015, up from 19.5 per cent in 2002 (see fi gure 8).
In summary, there is a noticeable trade-off between the achievement of MDG 1 and the other MDGs under the domestic resource mobilization scenarios. In the case of tax fi nancing, the government should avoid tax increases from falling on the poor, or compensate the poor through other income support measures, especially in the early years of the strategy. Bond fi nancing clearly seems to be the lesser option for Costa Rica, where, in fact, the critical domestic-debt and fi scal situation are already a main concern to macroeconomic policy makers. Recurring to external borrowing could alleviate such a constraint, but this may be accompanied with possible dangers of strongly rising currency mismatches between liabilities and assets held by domestic investors. More foreign borrowing could also exacerbate the trend towards exchange-rate appreciation. For all fi nancing strategies it seems to hold that the government should try to avoid further RER (2006), based on the MAMS model for Costa Rica.
a Th e incidence of extreme poverty is defi ned as the share of the total population living on less than 1$ a day.
Calculations are based on labour-market outcomes for diff erent types of workers as estimated in the MAMS model and after applying a microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6).
appreciation. It is not very likely that the recently introduced managed fl oating system allowing the colón to fl uctuate within a pre-established band will actually avoid this, unless the band is defi ned in such a way as to keep the exchange rate competitive. MDG investments in education and other investments in public infrastructure may strengthen the competitiveness of export sectors through productivity increases over time and compensate for the exchange-rate appreciation. While the MAMS model considers the eff ects of education and infrastructure improvements on productivity, it is possible that these eff ects are underestimated in the present scenario. First, there is little empirical evidence for Costa Rica regarding the quantitative impact of these factors on productivity growth and, second, the current scenarios do not take into consideration additional investments in physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports, irrigation systems and so on. 
Ecuador
Further progress in achieving the development goals is expected under the BAU scenario for Ecuador albeit not suffi cient to meet the MDG targets by 2015 (see table 3 ). Th e continuation of the education policies initiated in the fi rst few years of the new century would bring primary school completion rates to 95 per cent, just short of the target. Health outcomes would also fall short of the targets for MDGs 4 and 5 by a slight margin, implying that the BAU does not fully "reproduce" unchanged trends by which the target could be reached, as discussed above. Th e related assumptions for the BAU are considered reasonable as the impact of policies and other health determinants tends to be non-linear. Moreover, as mortality rates drop, relatively greater eff orts are needed as the prevalence of more complicated causes of death tends to increase. Th e targets for water and, particularly, sanitation would fall short by a somewhat wider margin. Th e target for the reduction of extreme poverty (MDG 1) would not be reached either under the baseline scenario, as also predicted by the partial equilibrium analyses discussed above.
Th e model simulations suggest that the required additional costs of achieving the MDGs would reach between 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points of GDP by the end of the simulation period (2015), depending on the fi nancing scenario. Th e scenarios for domestic resource mobilization are somewhat more costly as a share of GDP than the foreign borrowing scenario. Th e estimated extra costs increase towards the end of the period. Th is is so in part because with greater MDG achievement more children will be in school and more children and mothers will be using health services. Th e cost also increase, especially in health care, because the MAMS model assumes diminishing returns to MDG investments, that is as one gets closer to the target, it takes a bigger eff ort to get also the last children in school and further reduce infant mortality. Th e average additional costs per year for the full period 2001-2015 therefore are lower (see table 4).
10 Public expenditures for primary education would nearly have to be doubled from 1.1 to 1.8 per cent of GDP, while health expenditures would need to increase by no more than 0.3 percentage points to 2.3 of GDP per year on average for the period. Extra investments in water and sanitation infrastructure would incur an additional 0.3 per cent of GDP. To achieve all MDGs simultaneously, the Government would have to spend between 1.3 and 1.5 per cent more per annum than under the BAU.
11 Table 3 shows further that for primary education and infant and maternal mortality, achieving all the MDGs simultaneously is cheaper than the sum of the costs if, hypothetically, the MDGs were to be pursued separately. Th e savings are derived particularly from health costs. Th is 10 In the case of Costa Rica MDG costs do not rise towards the end of the simulation period as it is already quite close to achieving the MDGs from the base year and in the simulations it manages to achieve most already by 2011. 11 Th e costs are slightly higher as a percentage of GDP under the increased taxation or domestic borrowing scenarios than under the foreign borrowing scenario. a Poverty results are estimated after running a microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6).
result is driven by the synergies between the MDGs (achieving the education goal, for instance, helps achieve the health target faster) as well as by economy-wide eff ects (for instance, the reduction in wage costs as the wage premium for higher-educated workers falls with better education outcomes). Such synergies are typically not considered in other cost projections of education and health goals. In the Costa Rican case, similar synergies are less important (see table 2), because the country has already a high degree of MDG achievement in the baseline. Th us, for instance, only small gains are needed to achieve the child mortality target and hence its achievement will also have only a small spill-over eff ect on achievement of the education target. Table 4 . Th e simulated cost estimates do not take into consideration other effi ciency gains which could be obtained by making budget allocations more cost eff ective or by trying to improve the effi ciency in the delivery of services. As mentioned above, Vos and Ponce (2004) found in the case of education expenditures that by reducing the number of redundant teachers whilst enhancing the quality of other educational inputs, the MDG target might be reached at virtually no additional costs; however, the required measures (fi ring a considerable number of teachers) for such a low-cost scenario will likely be politically diffi cult to implement. Th e outcomes discussed below do not consider all such options of creating fi scal space through effi ciency gains of this kind.
As in the case of Costa Rica, Ecuador's RER would appreciate in each of the scenarios, including the baseline, given the rise in non-tradable expenditures. Th e degree of appreciation is strongest, as expected, under the scenario involving foreign borrowing to fi nance the additional MDG expenditures (see fi gure 9). Th is will erode competitiveness of exports (see fi gure 10), particularly non-traditional exports, thereby further increasing the country's reliance on oil and other, mainly agricultural, primary commodities. Th e model simulations suggest further that in the given timeframe until 2015, the productivity gains of achieving the MDGs by themselves are not suffi cient to stimulate export production with higher technology content.
Th e scenario involving increased government borrowing to fi nance the MDGs, as in the case of Costa Rica, would slow the increase in private investment demand owing to the crowding-out eff ect of credit available to the private sector (see fi gure 11). Th is eff ect by itself also implies in Ecuador's case that the tradeoff between GDP growth and MDG achievement is largest in the scenario involving domestic borrowing. Th is trade-off is, however, only mild as can be seen from fi gure 12. Source: León, Rosero and Vos (2006) , based on the MAMS model for Ecuador. a Th e additional costs are for the foreign fi nancing scenario and are measured as percentage deviations with respect to the BAU scenario. Th ey only increase marginally when there is mobilization of domestic resources to fi nance the new public investment.
Labour-market outcomes are by and large similar across the fi nancing scenarios, except that with the stronger real appreciation under the external-fi nancing scenario, the average real wage increase is somewhat greater, allowing for a stronger impact on poverty. Th e supply of skilled workers outpaces demand in each of the scenarios, producing a drop in the wage premium for this category of workers. Unskilled workers gain the most from the MDG strategy, as they would see real labour incomes expand at 4.0 per cent per annum. Th is, unlike in the Costa Rican case, would lead to a substantial redistribution of income, lowering income inequality by more than 10 per cent (as measured through the Gini coeffi cient of per capita household incomes). Th is, in combination with the moderate growth of income per capita of about 2 per cent per annum, would result in remarkable poverty reduction, but insuffi cient to reach the MDG-1 target by 2015 in any of the fi nancing scenarios (see fi gure 13). Hence, as in Costa Rica, the growth path associated with achieving MDGs 4, 5 and 7 does not generate enough jobs or labour income improvements to achieve MDG 1 simultaneously. Th e domestic borrowing scenario appears to be the least favourable for reducing poverty, essentially because of the crowing-out eff ect on investment and growth. Th is scenario would furthermore seem less attractive because of the strong increase in public indebtedness. Besides trying to protect social expenditures, Ecuador's fi scal framework is also aimed at reducing the external debt overhang. In the case of the domestic-borrowing scenario, domestic public debt would increase to almost 30 per cent in 2015, up from about 13 per cent in the base year (see fi gure 14). Domestic public debt has been historically low in Ecuador for lack of a developed bond market. Th e model assumes such a market exists, however, hence allowing for the indicated rise in indebtedness at a given interest rate. Th is most likely underestimates the real cost of this fi nancing strategy as, because of the underdevelopment of the domestic capital market, the government will only be able to issue bonds at very high rates.
Financing the MDG strategy with foreign borrowing would, in turn, lift external debt to unsustainable levels. Th e sustainable level of foreign indebtedness is defi ned at 40 per cent of GDP in the present fi scal policy framework (World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, 2004) . Th e MAMS model simulations suggest that this critical level would be surpassed by a substantial margin under the foreign-borrowing scenario, as the external debt-to-GDP ratio would move up to little more than 60 per cent by 2015 (see fi gure 15). Th e increase in the public debt overhang would be a concern under both scenarios as the total (2006), based on the MAMS model for Ecuador.
Calculations are based on labour-market outcomes for diff erent types of workers as estimated in the MAMS model and after applying the microsimulation methodology (see footnote 6). debt ratio would increase to nearly 70 per cent of GDP by 2015, which would be uncomfortably high even with the present high oil price levels. 12 Given Ecuador's track record of defaults on external debt, the foreignfi nancing scenario might raise most worries among international investors.
Th e tax-fi nancing scenario would avoid such concerns, albeit at the cost of slower private investment and consumption growth compared to that of the baseline. Th e MAMS model suggests that direct income tax revenue would have to be raised by 3 percentage points of GDP in this case, but further reductions in public debt would be gained. Ecuador has ample scope for further tax reforms, particularly in improving direct tax collection. Income tax revenues represent just 1.5 per cent of GDP, which is low by any standard. Tax reforms are politically diffi cult in Ecuador, however; the more so, when they aff ect higher income groups. Hence, the challenge to policy makers will be to convince the elites to contribute some of their recurrent wealth to human development and the long-term benefi t of the country. At the same time, with the current high oil prices, there is additional fi scal space to mobilize the resources for achieving the MDGs and the social goals that go beyond that. Th us, a further challenge is to make the existing framework for fi scal responsibility and stabilization of oil revenues work in order to eff ectively smooth adequate levels of public spending for poverty reduction and human development. Th is will require policies that enable public consumption-smoothing over a prolonged period of time-a challenge to Ecuadorian policy makers-but the fi scal responsibility law and fi scal stabilization fund established some time ago might provide, if consistently implemented, the right kind of framework to this end.
Conclusions
Poverty reduction and achievement of the other social goals defi ned in the Millennium Declaration should also be expected to yield a "growth dividend", as higher levels of human development facilitate productivity growth and economic development. While this may be true, additional public spending to achieve the 12 It should be noted that the baseline scenario incorporates the recent increases in oil prices which have eased the country's fi nancing constraints. It assumes that oil prices stay up during the simulation period, but this may be too optimistic as oil prices have historically shown strong fl uctuations. MDGs will also come with a cost, and adequate fi nancing resources will have to be found in order to fi nd the desired synergy between the economic and social gains of the poverty reduction strategy. Th e main tradeoff , perhaps, is of an intertemporal nature. Th e growth dividend will take time to mature. For instance, keeping children in school longer for better educational outcomes also implies that there will be a time lag between the current investments in education and the productivity eff ects of having a better-trained workforce.
As we have illustrated in this paper, the way investments are fi nanced now may aff ect MDG achievements over time. Even in a middle-income country like Costa Rica, where the MDGs are within near reach, nonnegligible macroeconomic trade-off s exist. In an economy reliant on export-led growth such as Costa Rica, Dutch Disease eff ects leading to RER appreciation, on the one hand, and tax increases that aff ect disposable incomes and domestic government borrowing that crowds out private investment, on the other, cause lower economic growth and less reduction of income poverty, at least in the short run. It makes clear once more that achieving the MDGs is not merely a matter of looking at aid eff ectiveness and eff ective social sector strategies and targeted poverty reduction programmes. It is, rather, more critical to adopt cautious macroeconomic policies that are consistent with poverty-reduction goals. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, this requires a view of macroeconomic policy-making that is broader than merely focusing on economic and monetary stability, as had been the mainstream approach of adjustment programmes in developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s.
Th e MAMS framework helps identify the main trade-off s, and this may better inform policy makers regarding how to conduct macroeconomic policies consistent with long-term development goals. Country contexts diff er as well as the policy space available to pursue such policies, and more country-level analysis is required to understand fully all the trade-off s involved and the implications for the sequencing of policy interventions towards the MDGs. Furthermore, much more research is needed to understand the underlying quantitative relations. Th e MAMS framework as applied here goes a long way in establishing these, but as yet fairly little is known about the precise degree of synergy that exists between the diff erent MDGs and the productivity gains that can be obtained from higher levels of human development. Moreover, much more analysis is needed of the scope for creating more fi scal space through more cost-eff ective public interventions in health, education and poverty reduction programmes. Existing studies are, by nature, programme-and sector-specifi c, but are rarely conducted with a view to serving broader macroeconomic policy discussions.
Such quantitative interactions have been imperfectly captured in the present general equilibrium analyses. Nonetheless, policy simulation analyses of this kind are indispensable when trying to obtain insight into the eff ectiveness of macroeconomic fi nancing strategies towards the achievement of the MDGs and should therefore be helpful in informing and guiding national policy dialogues on these matters.
